MINORITY GROUP IN URBAN SOCIETY CONFLICT AND THREATS TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM A CASE STUDY OF SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE AGAINST AHMADIYYA IN URBAN SOCIETY

Barsihannor^{1*}, Gustia Tahir² & Haslinda Binti Hasan³ ^{1,2}Universitas Islam Negeri Alauddin Makassar, South Sulawesi, Indonesia. ³Universiti Utara Malaysia, Kedah, Malaysia. *e-mail: barsihannor@uin-alauddin.ac.id

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Abstract

This study explores the experiences of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community in the context of urban society, focusing on the manifestation of symbolic violence against this minority group and its implications for religious freedom. Symbolic violence encompasses various forms of discrimination, prejudice, and non-physical harm that target religious minorities. This research delves into the multifaceted dynamics surrounding the Ahmadiyya community's presence in urban areas and how they navigate challenges related to their faith and religious identity. The study is qualitative. The data were collected through online questionnaires and in-depth interviews with the Ahmadiyya congregations in three urban society as representatives of Indonesia namely Bandung (West Java), Makassar (South Sulawesi) and Lombok (West Nusa Tenggara) with the aim to examine the nature of symbolic violence against the Ahmadiyya community in urban society, highlight the broader implications for religious freedom in diverse societies as well as to find out the principle adhered by the Ahmadiyya group in maintaining its existence amid the pressure of the transnational radical Islamic groups. The research results show that apart from experiencing physical violence, the Ahmadiyya followers also experienced symbolic violence whose impacts were felt to be much more painful than physical violence. The symbolic violence occurs in Capital and Habitus domain. Despite undergoing the acts of violence, the Ahmadiyya congregation is still able to survive by adhering to the values that have been their principle, that is "Love for all and hatred for none".

Keywords: Ahmadiyya; Ideology; Intolerant; Symbolic Violence; Values.

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A. Introduction

Urban society in various parts of the worlds are crucial hubs of economic, social, cultural growth and religious development. However, amidts rapid urban development, various social and religious challenges often emerge. One of that is increasingly gaining attention is violence and discrimination against the Ahmadiyya group within the urban society.

Since the entry and increase of the transnational radical Islamic ideology movement in Indonesia, Indonesian Islam which has been known as a friendly religion, has suddenly turned into intolerant religion (Salehudin 2012). The Muslim minorities who are theologically opposed to these Islamic hardline groups have become targets of violence. In this context, the Ahmadiyya has been one of the target of violence by the groups who seek to isolate Ahmadiyya in Indonesian society (Fuller 2011). The Ahmadiyya moslem minority is often the object of repeated persecution by these hardline Islamic groups (Hamdi 2011; Nurhikmah 2017). The number of attacks on the Ahmadiyya far exceeds on other minorities. For example, in the last 10 years, the Ahmadiyya congregation experienced 276 times of violence in various places in Indonesia (Chairi 2019). In fact, according to Najib Burhani, before the reform era, Ahmadiyya had very good relations with mainstream Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama in Indonesia. Ahmadiyya had become a revivalist and modern organization that was quite respected (Burhani 2020).

The opening of the faucet of democracy in the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (A'an Suryana 2016, 2019a, 2020, 2017) gave the radical groups space to freely voice their religious ideas and ideology from all lines, both through the Islamic gatherings and on social media, they even do not hesitate to terrorize and attack people or groups who do not agree with their ideology (Hakim 2016; Robingatun 2017). This is proven by the rampant anti-Ahmadiyya propaganda. The Ahmadi (the Ahmadiyya followers) undergo physical and psychological violence, as well as considered infidels or non-Muslims. The hardline Islamic groups keep on intimidating and committing the act of violence against the Ahmadiyya Muslim minority. They burned and destroyed the headquarters, houses, and mosques belonging to the Ahmadiyya, even Ahmadiyya residents had to leave their homes and flee to other more secure places. It turns out the era of democracy that should have brought blessings has actually resulted in disaster to minority groups (Solikhin 2016). The International Amnesty calls the threatens to Ahmadiyya a continuation of discrimination against minority groups in Indonesia. The Liberal Islam Network and Civil Society Alliance (AMM) considers it a violation of human rights (Kurniawan 2006). Meanwhile, a Muslim scholar, the late Ahmad Syafii Ma'arif who was also the former chairman of Muhammadiyah (the biggest Islamic Organization in Indonesia) strongly condemned the actions of this hard-line Islamic groups which always impose its will and ideology (Maarif 2010).

However, the presence of government regulations, MUI fatwas and attacks by extremist groups against Ahmadiyya are not without reason. First, the Government issued a Joint Decree (SKB) of the Minister of Religion, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Attorney General in 2008. It is hoped that this SKB will become a joint reference (of the Government, mass organizations, community members, and the Ahmadiyya themselves) to avoid friction in life. community regarding the existence of the Ahmadiyya sect (Abdul Jamil Wahab 2018). Second, the issuance of the MUI fatwa aims to protect the Muslim's faith from misleading interpretations as understood by the Ahmadi. The Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) is one of the authorities that is considered to have the right to label the creed or faith as heretics or infidels. The MUI's fatwa is an actualization of MUI's role as guardian of the faith of Muslims in Indonesia. This situation is also interpreted as a response from the majority group to minority groups who have committed error and disbelief (Khodijah, Aulia 2021). Third, FPI and other hardline groups attacked Ahmadiyya not without reason. According to them, the attack was aimed at purifying religious teachings and also guarding the MUI fatwa (Nurdin et al. 2019).

So far, a number of research on violence against the Ahmadiyya have often been carried out. The tendency of the research focuses more on the physical violence experienced by the Ahmadiyya congregation (Nurfitriani, Abdullah, and Mengge 2021; Baihaqi 2020; Nurdin et al. 2019). This research tries to examine the symbolic violence experienced by the Ahmadiyya, and to know how the Ahmadiyya community can survive amid the onslaught of transnational radical Islamic ideology. This study complements the existing shortcomings related to the results of research on Ahmadiyya in Indonesia.

In general, violence is all forms of actions that deviate from aspects of human values and do not prioritize human rights, including imposing the will and taking all actions to discredit minority groups who do not share the same view (Supriyanto 2014). As a result, there is social inequality among society which results in social inequality and the emergence of conflict. Violence can occur invisibly but through ideological structures that engineer social action.

An anthropologist from France, Bourdieu explained that violence is not only interpreted as an action that touches the physical aspect but also the non-physical aspect, which is related to ideology. The violence that cannot be seen with naked eye depends on sensitivity to the system which Bourdieu calls symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1989). Symbolic violence does not directly affect the victim's body but is very hurtful and lasts a very long time, even for decades (Gusnita 2010). Symbolic violence can cause other violence such as physical, psychological, economic, cultural, and so forth. In addition, symbolic violence is interpreted as a communication mechanism characterized by unequal and hegemonic power relations wherein one party views himself as superior in terms of morals, ethnicity, religion, gender, and age (Anggraeni 2018). In terms of concepts, symbolic violence can be analyzed through capital, habitus, and arena domains (Retnosari 2019). This is consistent with the opinion of Pepper et al who stated that violence can occur in all aspects of society (Pepper and Powell 2022).

Symbolic violence in Bourdieu's view is a form of violence through a pattern of domination of the social structure in which upper-class groups "force" their ideology, culture, habits, or lifestyle on the lower-class they dominate (M. Syukur 2019). This cultural chain by Bourdieu is also known as Habitus. The lower-class people are forced to accept, live, practice, and admit that the upper-class habitus is an appropriate habitus for them (lower-class), while the lower class habitus is a habitus that should be thrown away (Watkins 2018). Bourdieu states that habitus cannot be understood singly as it carries multiple meanings (Clark 2004). In the process of symbolic violence, there is also capital and arena (field). Capital is a person's main strength in dominating others (Cui and Worrell 2019). Symbolic violence will only occur in minority groups both ideologically and quantitatively. In Bourdieu's analysis, symbolic violence can occur in minority community groups such as adherents of minority religions, minority beliefs or sects within a religion (Putri 2018).

In Bourdieu's view, symbolic violence is within the realm of power. That is, violence originally comes from the practice of power. When one class dominates another, in the process of domination it will result in symbolic violence (Putri 2019). In addition, symbolic violence is interpreted as a communication mechanism characterized by unequal and hegemonic power relations in which a person or group

views themselves as superior in terms of morality, ethnicity, religion, race, age as well as gender (Anggraeni 2018). In terms of symbolic violence, the relationship is related to the biased image of the other party, and the monopoly of meaning in textual, visual, color, sound, and so on.

Based on the research results of Philip Zimbardo (2000), a social psychologist, social factors are much stronger than psychological factors in promoting act of violence. He identified six factors that cause good people doing bad: (a) indoctrination into thought systems that rationalize or legitimize violence; (b) obedience to authority, without accepting dissent; (c) anonymity and deindividuation; (d) diffusion of responsibility (eg, "just following orders" or transmit violent behavior to a group of people); (e) gradual escalation of violence; (f) dehumanization of the enemy or victim. Of these six factors, Eller is of the view that blind obedience to authority is very dangerous (Eller 2014).

In addition to blind obedience to authority as one of the most dangerous, interests and ideology also occupy a position that is no less dangerous, even being considered the main trigger for act of violence. In this context, interest is interpreted as the desire of humans, both individually and in groups. If there is inequality or injustice in their group, there will be competition that brings about conflict and can turn into violence (Rahardjo 2018). Likewise, with the ideological factor, religion is interpreted as a social phenomenon that greatly contributes to individual and group identity, so it cannot be denied that ideology can be the form of indoctrinating group interests, although not all acts of violence in the name of religion carry the interests of a certain religion, religion is packaged properly to perpetuate the interests.

Inequality in social structure also creates a genealogy of violence that continues to develop according to the context of the times and the power relations. Inequality of relations in power will continue to create new subaltern groups (Suryawati, Seran, and Sigit 2021). The subaltern group will continue to experience violence from the more dominant structural forces. Not only that, but other minority groups will also experience ideological violence continuously. Marginalization is a phenomenon of usurping space in the self-expression of individuals who have no power over social dynamics schemes (Christian Desmiwati 2018). In addition to subaltern groups as objects of ideology-based violence, another object of violence that is the act of violence in the name of religion, even though religion teaches harmony, peace, and civilization (Noviyanto 2021). Textual and normative interpretations of religion are often used as justifications for acts of violence in the name of religion. Therefore, many thinkers consider this incident as the basis for their argument that religion is a source of conflict and violence (Ismail 2021).

A professor of anthropology at Boston University, Jack David Eller presents a comprehensive view of religious violence in his book Introducing Anthropology of Religion. Eller argues that since the early 21st-century religion and violence have a relationship that cannot be ignored. Violence cannot be separated from the "ugliness" of religion by referring to the existence of views or distinctions by society to label religion as bad and good religion (Eller 2014). Meanwhile, violence is often separated from the aspect of religiosity which results in conflict being packaged in the name of "religion" (Kaelani 2020). In this case, violence looks like a social construction carried out by certain actors under certain conditions for certain reasons.

B. Methods

This research is qualitative with the type of case study. Case study research focuses on one particular object which is raised as a case to be studied in depth so as to reveal the reality behind the phenomenon. This research used phenomenological approach that is a type of qualitative research that looks and hears more closely and in detail an individual's explanation and understanding of their experiences. The data used was related to the violence experienced by the Ahmadiyya congregation as well as data about the principles of the Ahmadiyya community to face the violence in the name of religion. The research locations comprise Urban Community group in Bandung West Java, Makassar South Sulawesi, and Lombok West Nusa Tenggara. The selection of these three locations is considered a representation of the Western, Central, and Eastern regions of Indonesia. The data were obtained from primary and secondary sources, and collected through the questionnaire. To strengthen the questionnaire, online and in-dept interviews were also conducted with several members and the administrators of Ahmadiyya congregation in each region. Secondary data are taken from documents or information from the mass media. To maintain the confidentiality of informants, the names of informants are anonymized to D1, D2, and so on. The restatement technique is used to describe collectively the data delivered by the informants.

C. Findings and Discussion

1. Findings

Symbolic Violence

Symbolic violence is a domination to control other group through communication (especially language communication), or a form of violence through a pattern of domination of social structures in which the upper-class group "imposes" its ideology, culture, habits, or lifestyle on the lower-class group it dominates through capital, habitus, and arena (field) domains. In this respect, the researcher just found the symbolic violence occurred in Capital and Habitus domains.

Capital Domain

Capital Domain is a form of symbolic violence resulting from capital owned by a group of people. Capital can be like power, political or economic (Mu 2022). Bourdieu's definition of capital does not only mean capital as capital in material form, but rather capital is the result of accumulated work (in a "material" or "growing" form - imbued within a person). Bourdieu mentioned the terms social capital, cultural capital, symbolic capital. (Setiawan 2015). In this regard, government regulations and the MUI Fatwa are forms of symbolic violence in the realm of capital.

From the data of symbolic violence in terms of Capital domain, it is known that 100 % of 90 respondents stated that the issuance of Fatwa of the Indonesian Council of Ulama became a trigger for violence in the name of religion. When asked whether the governmental regulation such as the Joint Ministerial Decree was also a trigger to the act of violence, 84 (97.7%) respondents agree and only 2.3% stated that they didn't know it. 90.7% of respondents considered the fatwa and governmental regulation were used by the perpetrators to justify the act of violence. Therefore, without hesitation all respondents stated that such regulation is a kind of symbolic violence that affect more painfully.

From the data above, it is known that the issuance of the Indonesian Council of Ulama's fatwa and government regulations from both the central and regional levels,

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according to the informants, really hurt their feelings and existence. The fatwa and regulations trigger the act of violence against the Ahmadiyya congregation, both physically and symbolically. In this regard, informant D1, one of the informants stated:

"We want to live comfortably, peacefully, and quietly like other Muslims, but what hurts us the most is the issuance of the Fatwa of MUI no 11 2005 and the issuance of the three Ministerial Decrees (Joint Ministerial Decree) followed by regional regulations in several regions that prohibit us from carrying out religious activities" (D1 2023).

D.2 also stated:

"The MUI's fatwa and this regional regulation have been used by Islamic hardline groups to justify anarchic actions, and some of our congregations have had to evacuate. Up to the present time, the Ahmadiyya community in West Nusa Tenggara has not been able to return home due to the absence of permits and security guarantees" (D2 2023).

According to the Ahmadiyya congregation (Jamaah), the regulation does not provide a sense of justice because it is one-sided. In the process of making regulations, the Ahmadiyya was never involved or asked for opinions. As a result, the Ahmadiyya congregation is very restricted to carry out religious activities.

In this regard, D3 stated:

"We have the right to worship according to our beliefs, and this is regulated by the state constitution, but the West Java regional regulation through the Governmental Regulation no 12 of 2011 issued by the local government made us to have limitations in carrying out religious activities... frankly we are sad and disappointed" (D3 2023).

The informant's statement above shows that symbolic violence not only hurt the feelings of the Ahmadiyya community as a result of the MUI's fatwa declaring Ahmadiyya heretical, but more than that, in the name of this fatwa, the perpetrators of violence attacked and destroyed the mosques of the Ahmadiyya congregation and even evicted them from their homes. This MUI's fatwa is also used by some anti-Ahmadiyya preachers to provoke people in the pulpit (religious gathering) and use it as an arena to reproduce hate speech in the name of religion. In this regard, D4 stated: "*The MUI's fatwa is a reference for preachers and anti-Ahmadiyya community leaders to use the pulpit or mosque as an arena to reproduce the hate speech or discourses of hatred against Ahmadiyya*" (D4 2023). From this data, it is known that the existence of fatwas and local regulations become a reference for perpetrators of violence to produce hate speech against Ahmadiyya.

Habitus Domain

Habitus is a mental structure or cognitive that a person uses to deal with social life. Habits describes a series of trends that encourages a social actor or person to act and react in ways certain (Novarisa 2019). In the context of violence in the domain of habitus, Ahmadiyya religious practices or beliefs are considered different from mainstream beliefs. It resulted in symbolic violence in the habitus domain. From the data of symbolic violence in terms of Habitus domain, it is known that 62.8 % of respondents sated that the attackers forced the Ahmadiyya followers (the Ahmadi) to renounce their beliefs and re-state the Shahadat (Statement to declare oneself as Moslem). A few others (37.2%) stated that there was no coercion. However, most of the respondents stated that they were intimidated by hurtful statements or narratives such as "Ahmadiyya is heretical, Disband Ahmadiyya, Ahmadiyya is infidel", and the like. When attacking Ahmadiyya followers, the most perpetrators also wore symbolic

religious or organizational identities such as flags or clothing, and carried with them wood, stick and poster of blasphemy.

The above data show that Ahmadiyya congregations often experience symbolic violence in the Habitus domain. Perpetrators of violence often impose their ideology, customs and beliefs and ask the Ahmadiyya congregation to abandon their ideology or belief. In this respect, the D5 informant stated: "*The perpetrators of violence entered the secretariat and forced us to re-state the Shahadat. They shouted for us to disband*" (D5 2023). Informant D6 also stated; "*When the attackers came, they screamed*; "*Disband the heretical group, Disband the Ahmadiyya, get rid of here. Ahmadiyya are not Muslims.*" *This blasphemy is so clear to our ears. This kind of violence hurts more*" (D6 2023).

The shouts of the perpetrators containing blasphemy and bullying as well as shouts for the disbandment of Ahmadiyya are forms of violence that deeply hurt the feelings of the Ahmadiyya congregation. Shouts such as "Ahmadiyya is infidel, heretical, disband Ahmadiyya" is a form of symbolic violence (non-physical terror) that is more painful than the physical violence they have experienced so far. Sometimes the perpetrators of violence came in groups using motorized vehicles or cars, dressed in white (robes) and carrying organizational flags. The children and women were frightened when the sound of the motorbike was deliberately loudened, then they forced the Ahmadiyya congregation to recite the Shahadat again as a form of repentance. The use of this attribute makes the congregation feel threatened. In this respect, informant D7 stated; "*The assailants were wearing attributes such as clothing and a flag, arriving in a car and a motorbike. The sound of the engine roaring in front of our house, makes us afraid and traumatized if we hear the sound of a loud motorbike again, or see people using these attributes"* (D7 2023).

The Ahmadiyya congregation once upon times was also prohibited to go to their mosque because the mosque was sealed by the government or perpetrators of violence. Informant D6 stated; "When I went to the mosque of Ahmadiyya to perform Friday prayer, I was stopped by the police, and he asked me to pray in another mosque. He said; "please go to another mosque, there is another choice" (D6 2023).

From the data above, it is known that the Ahmadiyya congregation feels very depressed and sad when they read posters of blasphemies, either in the form of billboards, banners, leaflets or the like which are sometimes put up in public areas. The Ahmadiyya followers (Ahmadi) just ask how they can be accused of being non-Muslims while they also practice the principles of faith in Islam.

The Ahmadiyya's Life Principle

Love for all hatred for none is a life principle (worldview) of the Ahmadiyya community. This principle guides the Ahmadiyya congregation to always love their fellow human beings regardless of ethnicity, religion and race, and to avoid hatred towards anyone, including those who committed violence against them. Based on the data, it is known that all respondents (100%) considered the principle of "Love for all, hatred for none" as their life principle because according to them (62.8%) this principle constitutes the Prophet's traditions and order. The way of implementing this principle is by praying for those who hate and attack, inviting them to have dialogue, engaging community through social donations, etc. Most Ahmadis (83.4%) believe this principle encourages the Ahmadiyya congregation to survive.

From the data above, it can be seen that the ability of the Ahmadiyya community to persist with their beliefs in the midst of strong threats is due to the worldview or way of life they hold, namely Love for all, hatred for none. Informant D10 disclosed in terms of this principles: "*The Ahmadiyya Congregation in all its movements adheres to the*

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principles of the Qur'an and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad to always show the values of peace as an effort to realize the conception of salvation for all mankind" (D10 2023). Informant D1 also stated;

"The principle of Love for all hatred for none is a real implementation of the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Referring to the experience of the Prophet who also faced many challenges, intimidation, and even death threats, the Ahmadiyya congregation also faced it with an attitude of love and compassion, no grudges in their hearts even though waves of opposition came from anti-Ahmadiyya all over the world" (D1 2023).

According to the informants, various forms of violence or hate crime, both in action, and verbal, in the real and virtual world, are common among the Ahmadiyya congregation. However, they still consistently promote this principle. With the slogan Love for all hatred for none, the Ahmadiyya community around the world is trying to get rid of the wrong view of Islam in general, and of the Ahmadiyya in particular. The principle "Love for all hatred for none" is simply a commitment to the teachings of Islam and the Ahmadiyya mission that requires helping others without expecting anything in return. This principle is practiced in life even though terrors and threats to the Ahmadiyya congregation come and go. This principle is a narrative of humanity and the primacy of resisting the stigma of the Ahmadiyya congregation.

2. Discussion

Symbolic Violence in Urban Community

Urban society is often considered a sign of high civilization in a region. Big cities tend to be centers of advanced economic, social and cultural life. Urban communities often have better access to various facilities and services, including education, health, culture, and diverse employment. However, it is important to remember that civilization is not only measured by the extent to which someone lives in an urban area. Being civilized also involves how individuals and society in general interact, behave, and respect social values and human rights. There are people living in rural or remote areas who have a high level of civilization in terms of social norms and human values.

The phenomenon of violence in urban community with the excuse of defending religion is in fact the most frightening specter (Rahman 2012). Ahmadiyya is one of the groups that becomes the object of the violence in urban society. Along with the times, Ahmadiyya is increasingly meeting its lowest point in social life. Various discriminatory actions and threats to the safety of the congregation continue to be carried out by hard-line Islamist who do not accept its presence. This can be seen from a series of violent acts, both physical and symbolic violence that continues to be experienced by the Ahmadiyya congregation.

A professor of anthropology at Boston University, Jack David Eller presents a comprehensive view of religious violence in his book Introducing Anthropology of Religion. Eller argues that since the early 21st-century religion and violence have a relationship that cannot be ignored. Violence cannot be separated from the "ugliness" of religion by referring to the existence of views or distinctions by society to label religion as bad and good religion (Eller 2014). Meanwhile, violence is often separated from the aspect of religiosity which results in conflict being packaged in the name of "religion" (Kaelani 2020). In this case, violence looks like a social construction carried out by certain actors under certain conditions for certain reasons.

Legally, the Ahmadiyya congregation in Indonesia is part of the Indonesian people who also have human rights and the stand equal before the law. Comitting act

of violence in any forms against the Ahmadiyya congregation or other minority group contradict the Human Right and Indonesian Constitution (A'an Suryana 2019b), because the practice of violence can illustrate that order and security in the nation and state have their own obstacles and threats that must be resolved immediately so as not to disrupt the harmonization of the nation and state.

Apart from this case, the acts of violence experienced by the Ahmadiyya congregation seems to increase in contemporary Indonesia. The development of hardline Islamic ideology that formed religious groups intensified the violence. This group found a wider stage when the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) fatwa and Local Government rules were used to legitimate the act of violence against the Ahmadiyya congregation. Central and regional government regulations, one of which is for Ahmadiyya to stop activities that are not following the interpretation of Islamic teachings (Hartawan, Cahyowati, and Zunnuraeni 2019) as well as the MUI's fatwa declaring Ahmadiyya to be deviant (Alnizar 2019a; Alnizar, Ma'ruf, and Manshur 2021; Breidlid 2013; Assyaukanie 2009) realized or not, become a tangible manifestation of the symbolic violence against the Ahmadiyya congregation. It has been the capital (referring to Bourdieu's term) to justify the violence. Even though the government thinks that the regulation constitutes an effort to immediately resolve intolerance, through this Capital the Anti-Ahmadiyya group makes this policy a justification to further express the acts of intolerance (Muhtador 2018).

From the perspective of the perpetrators of violence, their aim is good, as they intend to return the creed of the Ahmadiyya congregation to the correct faith based on their ideology, but in the perspective of the Ahmadiyya congregation, forcing them to re-state the shahadat is a form of symbolic violence that is very hurtful. Violence, both physical and symbolic, should be taken into account by the holders of power in making efforts to synchronize the policies issued and the impacts (Jackman 2002; Galtung 1969; Noort 2022). As an effort to minimize the acts of violence against the Ahmadiyya community, an approach or reconciliation effort is needed, and the government has to show the efforts to eliminate intolerance, not to be in a position that provide a space to be used by radical groups to perpetuate intolerance.

Based on the research results of Philip Zimbardo (2000), a social psychologist, social factors are much stronger than psychological factors in promoting act of violence. He identified six factors that cause good people doing bad: (a) indoctrination into thought systems that rationalize or legitimize violence; (b) obedience to authority, without accepting dissent; (c) anonymity and deindividuation; (d) diffusion of responsibility (eg, "just following orders" or transmit violent behavior to a group of people); (e) gradual escalation of violence; (f) dehumanization of the enemy or victim. Of these six factors, Eller is of the view that blind obedience to authority is very dangerous (Eller 2014).

In addition to blind obedience to authority as one of the most dangerous, interests and ideology also occupy a position that is no less dangerous, even being considered the main trigger for act of violence. In this context, interest is interpreted as the desire of humans, both individually and in groups. If there is inequality or injustice in their group, there will be competition that brings about conflict and can turn into violence (Rahardjo 2018).

Discrimination and inequality in social structure also creates a genealogy of violence that continues to develop according to the context of the times and the power relations. Inequality of relations in power will continue to create new subaltern groups (Suryawati, Seran, and Sigit 2021). The subaltern group will continue to experience violence from the more dominant structural forces. Not only that, but other minority

groups will also experience ideological violence continuously. Marginalization is a phenomenon of usurping space in the self-expression of individuals who have no power over social dynamics schemes (Christian, Desmiwati 2018). Textual and normative interpretations of religion are often used as justifications for acts of violence in the name of religion. Therefore, many thinkers consider this incident as the basis for their argument that religion is a source of conflict and violence (Ismail 2021).

Love for all hatred for none; A Peace Commitment of Ahmadi in Urban Society

Despite various polemics and threats that continue to be experienced, in facing the dynamics of daily life in urban society, the Ahmadiyya congregation adheres to the narrative of humanity and salvation that is Love for all hatred for none. This principle constitutes the spirit of survival amid the onslaught of times and culture which increasingly shows its impartiality towards the community or minority groups (Suhendra 2019). This principle of life is inseparable from the teachings and life of the Prophet Muhammad, which was also full of obstacles and even experienced threats to his life at that time. However, by sticking to the love of others without planting the slightest seed of hatred, the Prophet succeeded in making peace for mankind in general and Muslims in particular (Sulistyati 2015). The life principles of the Prophet Muhammad are interpreted and internalized by the Ahmadiyya community as a commitment to creating safety and peace for all mankind even though the Ahmadiyya have to face and accept all bad treatments from community groups who do not accept its existence.

All threats and obstacles, including intimidation, discriminatory or even violent acts that endanger their lives are accepted with grace, and they continue to strive for goodness without cultivating the seeds of hatred within themselves toward anyone. This can be seen in some examples of violence cases in some areas. Nevertheless, from these series of violence, the Ahmadiyya congregation did not put up any resistance but to ask for justice and law enforcement from the government (Irawan, Setiawan, Ar 2019). Whether or not there was a government response to the incident, the Ahmadiyya congregation continued and persisted with its initial principle, which is to spread a sense of love and concern for others without leaving seeds of hatred toward anyone. The principle of Love for all, hatred for None is the motto or spirit of the Ahmadiyya congregation which was first popularized by Mirza Nasir Ahmad who answered a question from one of the journalists regarding the Cold War between the West and East Blocks at an international conference in London held by the Ahmadiyya on 2nd to June 4th, 1978 (Wahab and Fakhruddin 2019). It was also confirmed and stated by Muhammad Yaqub (Ahmadiyya Preacher) that love for all, hatred for none is the spirit or motto of the Ahmadi in their life (Yaqub 2023).

In the midst of threats that continue to haunt, the Ahmadiyya congregation in different areas continue to promote and spread the values of humanity and peace. The slogan Love for all hatred for None is a special spirit for the Ahmadiyya congregation in all corners of the world. This motto contains values and messages that when they are treated badly, the Ahmadiyya community will not respond in the same way, but with prayer and kindness (Muhtador 2017).

Humanitarian commitment and peace are the keys to achieving the principles and values of safety as an essential means in Islam. To carry out its mission and struggle to advance Muslims and humanity in urban society, the Ahmadiyya has an aspect of spirituality as a basis for its footing which cannot be separated from the principle Love for all hatred for None (Adiwilaga 2018), which includes; First, the principles and values of solidarity that become the locomotive of daily da'wah

(mission) as an effort in shaping the character of human beings to have morals according to Islamic teachings (Al-Marwan, Hajam, and Farah 2021). Second, the value of obedience that must be carried out as one of the main pillars of humans as caliphate fil ard' (God's representative on earth) and requires the presence of the concept of servitude to Allah SWT in carrying out orders and avoiding His prohibitions. The value of obedience is interpreted by the Ahmadiyya community as an obligation of a servant to be truly happy in serving God with full ability and sincerity even though he has to sacrifice oneself for obedience to Him. Third, the value of peace must always be integrated with all actions. The Ahmadiyya congregation believes that the help and love of Allah will always prevent them from hatred and all deviant actions (Othman 2018). Fourth, the socio-economic values that are embraced by the Ahmadiyya congregation are at the same time constitute their characteristics. These social and economic values are manifested in the form of the Ahmadiyya congregation's concern for fellow congregations and other groups outside the congregation, for example through the organization of social activities that are beneficial to humans such as routine blood and eye donation activities carried out by the Ahmadiyya community in several areas.

The Ahmadiyya congregation starting in 2017 has thousands of congregations throughout Indonesia that are ready to carry out eyes donor activities. This is intended to build humanistic relations with the surrounding community to grow and develope harmony (Nurdin et al. 2019). The social activities they carry out are merely for humanity without expecting anything in return and the like (A. Syukur 2017). This spirit comes from their teachings which include forgiveness, being fair, doing good, and giving without expecting anything in return and not counting all the things that have been done.

D. Conclusion

The findings presented in this research show how minority groups undergo very strong mental stress. They not only experienced physical violence, such as murder, burning houses, mosques, and schools but also went through more painful symbolic violence especially in Capital and Habitus domain. Based on their confession, it's revealed that symbolic violence is far more painful for the Ahmadiyya congregation than physical violence, even though neither is an option. They undergo a prolonged injustice. However, the motto Love for all and hatred for none as their life principle can strengthen their mental and spirituality to still survive amid the pressure, attacks and violence by hardline Islamic groups.

This paper proposes that the government has to review local regulations that restrict the Ahmadiyya activities. Policies issued by the government as well as scholars should run on the basic principles of justice based on the concept of multiculturalism, where the diversity does not prevent the creation of equal rights in the public sphere. Thus, each party should accept, respect, and understand each other according to their rights regardless of language, ethnicity, tradition, religion, or other forms of diversities. Interfaith dialogue is important to be held among adherents of religions or thelogical schools, to know the traditions and understanding of others as well as to find the most important dimensions of traditions and understandings that can encourage the creation of peace without prejudice and hostility. In order to accommodate this diversity, the government, minority groups and majority groups can jointly formulate regulations so as not to harm each other and even support the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. This is very important because the conflict in the name of religion is a 200 | Akademika: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam Vol. 28, No. 02 Juny - December 2023

latent danger that could happen at any time. Therefore, the government should be able to take the path of reconciliation. First, reconciliation can be realized only if the government opens a pattern of discussion and decision-making in an aspirational and appreciative way so that conflicts that occur can be accommodated peacefully. Second, the government should not issue a policy that will instead be used by radical groups as a shield to perpetuate the acts of violence against the Ahmadiyya community or other minority groups.

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F. Author Contributions Statement

The authors worked together in developing the ideas and revealing the issues related to the research topic. Barsihannor (co-author) was responsible for the data collection form both questionnaire and interview, and research discussion analysis, while Gustia Tahir verified the analytical methods used. Haslinda contributed the theoretical framework and developed the analytical methods employed in the study. All authors collaborated in discussing the results of research and making conclusion.

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